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Abstract
This paper considers the environmental policy and welfare implications of a merger be-
tween environment ¯rms (i.e., ¯rms managing environmental resources or supplying pollution
abatement goods and services). The traditional analysis of mergers in Cournot oligopolies
is extended in two ways. First, we show how environmental policy a®ects the incentives of
environment ¯rms to merge. Second, we stress that mergers in the eco-industry impact wel-
fare beyond what is observed in other sectors, due to an extra e®ect on pollution abatement
e®orts; this might lead to disagreements between an anti-trust agency seeking to limit market
concentration which can be detrimental to consumer surplus and a benevolent regulator who
maximizes total welfare.
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JEL Classi¯cation: D62, H23, L11
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the provision of goods and services to abate pollution or manage envi-
ronmental resources has by and large become the core business of specialized private ¯rms. This
so-called eco-industry is now approaching the aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors in size, with
an estimated 2005 global market of US $653 billion that is expected to reach US $776 billion
by 2010.1 Unsurprisingly, government agencies and policy makers are paying extra attention to
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1this sector: not only does it account for a signi¯cant number of jobs (1.5 million jobs, or 3.8%
of total employment, in the European Union alone in 2002, according to ?), it also constitutes
a key ingredient of industrial competitiveness, trade advantage and social stability in a world
where the pressure to protect environmental resources is mounting.
Acknowledging this development, the economic literature has lately re-examined optimal
environmental policies in the presence of an eco-industry, assuming the economy is either closed
(David & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e 2005, Nimubona & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e 2005, Requate 2005, Canton
et al. 2005) or open (Fees & Muehlheusser 2002, Copeland 2005, Canton 2006). These articles,
however, did not study how environmental regulation a®ects concentration and mergers in the
eco-industry. Investigating such aspects of industry structure seems nevertheless crucial for an
understanding of the supply of environmental resources and abatement technologies. In a ¯rst
attempt to do so, ? just took into account endogenous entry and exit by environment ¯rms in
establishing optimal emission taxes. The present paper, on the other hand, will now consider
the relationship between emission taxes and mergers of environment ¯rms.
Mergers and acquisitions are quite frequent in the eco-industry. The main ¯rms in the
U.S. waste management market, for instance, namely Waste Management Inc., Allied Waste
Inc. and Republic Services, secured their growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s via mergers
and acquisitions. In the air pollution abatement segment, BASF Catalyst, a division of the
German chemical manufacturer BASF, announced in May 2006 it had ¯nally got hold of its U.S.
competitor Engelhard, in a hostile takeover that ended up costing more than US $5 billions;
this acquisition constitutes BASF's largest such transaction in its 140-year history. In water
treatment, Idaho-based Blue Water Technologies Inc. announced in September 2006 it had
acquired Applied Process Technology Inc., a Texan ¯lter producer. These cases, and many
others, seem to corroborate a trend reported earlier by the World Trade Organization (WTO,
1998):
"The available evidence suggests that there is a tendency towards increasing concentration in
the environmental industry. A study on mergers and acquisitions in the US in the environmental
industry suggests that scale bene¯ts and consumer preferences favour large ¯rms which tend to
achieve higher returns than their smaller rivals (European Commission, 1994). [...] As a result
of these developments, the number of mergers and acquisitions increased between 1987 and 1991
at an annual rate of 56 per cent to reach 223 transactions in 1991."
Horizontal mergers have of course been a matter of public policy concern for some time
already (see the Clayton Act, 1914 and the Treaty of Rome, Article 81(1), 1957). To inform
antitrust authorities, one early branch of the literature looked at the welfare implications of
mergers (?, Farrell & Shapiro 1990). On the one hand, mergers may generate scale economies
and deliver e±ciency gains; on the other hand, they can reduce industry competition and induce
losses in consumer surplus. Public authorities will then have to trade-o® these positive and
2negative e®ects in deciding to approve a merger or not.
Another stream of literature would rather analyze incentives for ¯rms to merge, by comparing
pro¯ts before and after a merger. Under linear demand and cost functions, Salant et al. (1983)
initially showed that the number of ¯rms merging together must account for at least 80% of
incumbent ¯rms, in order to make a merger pro¯table. Extending this model, Fauli-Oller (1997)
next emphasized the concavity of demand as the main determinant of pro¯tability: the more
concave the demand function, the less lucrative the merger. An important caveat of these
analyses is that, with linear costs, ¯rms remained identical after a merger to what they were
beforehand. Perry & Porter (1985) ¯rst relaxed the linear-cost assumption, thereby introducing
synergies through the amount of the industry's total capital stock possessed by incumbent ¯rms
- the larger a ¯rm's share of capital, the lower its production costs. Based on this approach,
McAfee & Williams (1992) returned to the welfare implications of horizontal mergers, showing
that current Mergers Guidelines might at the same time authorize some welfare-reducing mergers
and forbid some pro¯table welfare-enhancing ones.
The merger literature was recently specialized to investigate the relationship between en-
vironmental regulation and incentives to merge (Hennessy & Roosen 2002, ?). Current work
deals with polluting sectors, however, not the eco-industry. The latter, to be sure, raises a
number of speci¯c issues. First, while incentives to merge are of course also in°uenced by en-
vironmental policy, the relationship holds in a di®erent way: as ¯rst pointed out by David and
Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e (2005), environmental policy a®ects both the size and elasticity of demand
for environmental goods and services, hence the market power and potential spillovers resulting
from a merger. Second, the welfare implications of a given merger go beyond consumer sur-
plus and ¯rm pro¯t. Such a merger in°uences the supply of environmental goods and services,
which then impinges on the quality of the environment; the traditional trade-o® between lower
production costs and consumer surplus reduction must therefore be properly extended.
This paper's raison d'^ etre is then to consider horizontal mergers in the eco-industry, dealing
with the above speci¯cities in a Perry & Porter (1985) and McAfee & Williams (1992) frame-
work where such mergers also entail reductions in production cost. We shall show ¯rst that the
minimal size for a pro¯table merger increases with the stringency of environmental regulation;
in other words, mergers are less likely to occur as environmental policy tightens up. This result
seems empirically testable. It implies, moreover, that putting stronger requirements on polluters
might not lower competition in the eco-industry and exacerbate consequently the market power
of environment ¯rms. We shall also stress that, since mergers in the eco-industry impact wel-
fare beyond what is observed in other sectors due to their e®ect on abatement e®orts, some
disagreements might arise between an anti-trust agency seeking to limit the impact of market
concentration on consumer surplus and a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize total
welfare.
3The paper unfolds as follows. The following section presents our model. Section 3 shows
that a higher tax on polluting emissions reduces incentives to merge in the eco-industry. Section
4 explores next the conditions under which a merger in the eco-industry is welfare enhancing.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The basic model
Consider a representative price-taking polluting ¯rm that produces one consumption good and
sells it on a competitive market at unit price P.2 The marginal production cost for this good is
assumed to be constant and is referred to as c. For an output level x, the ¯rm generates polluting
emissions e(x;A), where A represents the ¯rm's abatement e®ort. Without loss of generality,
we take the emission function to be e(x;A) = 1
2(x ¡ A)2. This means that ex(x;A) > 0 (more
production entails more pollution), eA(x;A) < 0 (more abatement decreases total emissions),
exx(x;A) > 0 (emissions from the last unit produced increase with the production level), and
eAA(x;A) > 0 (abatement e®ort is subject to diseconomies of scale). Last, we have exA(x;A) < 0
(the higher the abatement, the less the last unit produced generates pollution).3
The representative polluting ¯rm is subject to a constant tax t per-unit of emission. However,
it can purchase abatement goods and services from a specialized environment industry at a unit
price p. It then sets production and abatement e®orts in order to maximize the following pro¯ts:
max
x;A
' = Px ¡ cx ¡ pA ¡ te(x;A) . (1)
Normalizing ¯nal consumers' demand as P(x) = 1 ¡ x, basic calculations yield the following
optimal levels of production and abatement for the polluting ¯rm:
x = 1 ¡ c ¡ p (2)




Let p(A) denote the inverse demand function faced by the environment ¯rms. It is given by the
polluters' decision to abate, as captured by equation (3). Rearranging this equation, the inverse
demand is then p(A) = ®1 ¡ ®2A, where ®1 =
(1¡c)t
1+t and ®2 = t
1+t. Note that both coe±cients
- the intercept and the slope - are increasing in t, the environmental tax.
The eco-industry is initially composed of n identical ¯rms competing µ a la Cournot. Following




2One could consider an oligopolistic polluting industry without modifying our main results, as long as this
industry acts as a price-taker on the market for abatement goods and services.
3Compared to David & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e (2005), Nimubona & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e (2005) and Canton et al.
(2005), we do not assume that the emission function is additively separable.
4where ai is the ¯rm's output and ki its capital investment. Firms are identical and
Pn
i=1 ki = K.
Each ¯rm thus holds an equal share ki = k = K









One can check that the letter ¯i indicates ¯rm i's market share, whereas B renders the overall
size of the market.4
The following equilibrium quantities and price are now derived for the pre-merger case where















An environment ¯rm's pro¯t is then





This section will now consider the incentives of environment ¯rms to merge. The ¯rst part studies
the minimal size of a pro¯table merger. The second part examines the impact of environmental
policy.
3.1 On merger size and pro¯tability
Suppose that s ¯rms in the eco-industry decide to merge. The total capital of new entity is then
sk. Indexing by s the equilibrium values for the merged ¯rm and by o those for each of the




4More precisely, the market share of a ¯rm i is si =
¯i
B .
5In this case, ki = k;8i and ¯i = ¯;8i. Therefore ai = a;8i.




In this case, B becomes Bm = ¯s + (n ¡ s)¯o, so
Bm =
s(®2k)2(1 + n ¡ s) + n®2k



























It can be seen that Bm < B and pm > p, so the size of the market is reduced and the price for
abatement is increased with the merger. Moreover, ao > a and as < a, meaning that outsiders
increase their output and insiders decrease theirs with the merger.
A merger, however, is not always pro¯table for the involved ¯rms. To be sure, there are
two main reasons for ¯rms to merge. First, this reduces production cost. Second, total output
will shrink, which increases the market price and the ¯rms' pro¯t (Perry & Porter 1985, Fauli-
Oller 2002). ? and others have argued, on the other hand, that ¯rms which do not participate in
the merger may actually bene¯t more than those which merge. They expand output and pro¯t
from a higher market price, thereby free-riding on the merger's participants who in turn do not
capture all the rent they generate. This may dissuade ¯rms from merging.
Using the methodology of Allain & Souam (2004), one can show that an s-¯rms merger is
pro¯table for the insiders only if s is superior to a threshold ^ s (i.e. if the number of insiders
is su±cient high relative to the number of outsiders). The pro¯t of the merged ¯rm is equal
to ¼s = pmas ¡
a2
s
2sk. Compare now the pro¯t of the merged entity with s times the ex ante
individual pro¯t given by equation (4). It can be shown that the sign of the di®erence is the
same as the sign of the following expression:
g(s;n;®2) = (®2k + 1)2(2s®2k + 1)[1 + (n + 1)®2k]2 (5)
¡(2®2k + 1)[s(®2k)2(2 + n ¡ s) + ®2k(n + s + 1) + 1]2
This expression is negative when s is inferior to a unique threshold ^ s, and positive otherwise.
This constitutes our ¯rst result.
6Lemma 1 There exists a unique threshold on the number of insiders (s) from which a merger
in the eco-industry becomes pro¯t-enhancing.
A proof of the existence and unicity of this threshold is available upon request.
3.2 The impact of environmental policy
Let us now examine how a change in environmental policy can a®ect incentives to merge in the
eco-industry.
Clearly, the level of the emission tax t in°uences the polluters' abatement decisions and the
ensuing inverse demand function p(A) = ®1 ¡ ®2A, where ®1 =
(1¡c)t
1+t and ®2 = t
1+t. Note that
a more stringent tax not only increases the market for abatement by raising the intercept ®1;
it also modi¯es the price-elasticity of demand for abatement goods and services by augmenting
®2. The parameter ®1, however, does not appear in g(s;n;®2). The impact of a change in
environmental taxation on merger pro¯tability occurs thus only through the slope coe±cient ®2.
To ¯x ideas, let us ¯rst look at the case of a two-¯rm merger. Such a merger enhances pro¯ts
if and only if
g(2;n;®2) > 0 , (6)
where
g(2;n;®2) = 1 ¡ 2(n ¡ 5)®2k + [17 + (2 ¡ 3n)n](®2k)2 + 4[1 ¡ (n ¡ 2)n](®2k)3 .
Plotting this function, we can show that, as ®2 grows across the interval [0;1], g(2;n;®2) ends
up taking negative values. Hence, as the emission tax t increases (so ®2 goes up as well), the
two-¯rm merger tends to become unpro¯table. In other words, raising the emission tax reduces
incentives to form such a merger.
Turning to the general case of an s-¯rm merger, we found that a similar conclusion held
(qualitatively) in numerous simulations: namely, a rise in the emission tax t (so in ®2) makes
mergers of a given size less pro¯table.6 The threshold ^ s, moreover, tends to go up with t. This
supports our ¯rst Proposition.
Proposition 1 When n > 2, making the emission tax more stringent raises the minimal size ^ s
at which a merger becomes pro¯table.7
The intuition behind this result is the following. As explained before, incentives to merge come
from the opportunity to reduce costs while lowering output and increasing prices. Outsiders,
6Such simulations were carried out for n 2 [2;10
10] and K 2 [0:01;10
10].
7Were the eco-industry a duopoly (n = 2), g(2;2;®2) would always be positive, as the two ¯rms would naturally
prefer to merge to form a monopoly. This comes from the absence in this case of free-riding outsiders.
7Figure 1: The impact of a change in the environmental policy on a two-¯rms merger pro¯tability
(n > 2)
8however, will free-ride on the latter, thereby deterring smaller mergers. In the present context,
a bigger emission tax will amplify such free-riding, as it makes demand for abatement less price-
elastic and allows therefore a given merger to further raise prices.
This proposition re¯nes the well-known observation that incentives to merge decrease as B
- the size of the market - increases (Fauli-Oller 2002), or equivalently that horizontal mergers
generally happen in declining industries (?).8 In the American waste management market, for
instance, the main U.S. ¯rms seem indeed to have secured their growth through mergers and
acquisitions when the market was stable (?, ?). Our explanation, however, emphasizes the
impact of environmental regulation on the price-elasticity rather than on the size of demand for
abatement goods and services.
Let us now investigate the welfare implications of horizontal mergers in the eco-industry.
4 A welfare analysis
Social welfare is de¯ned as the sum of the ¯nal consumers' surplus (CS), the polluting industry's
pro¯t (') and the eco-industry's total pro¯ts (¦ =
n X
i=1
¼i), minus the social damage caused by




















E = ºe(x;A) .
As in ?, let tax revenues be redistributed in a neutral way. We shall now examine separately
the consequences of a merger on each of these functions.
4.1 The eco-industry's pro¯ts
Participants to a merger always increase their pro¯ts, for they would otherwise choose to remain
apart and the merger would not occur. Outsiders are also winners, since their per unit production
costs remain unchanged while they can sell at a higher price. Hence, the eco-industry's total
pro¯ts always goes up after some environment ¯rms merge.
8Note that B =
n®2k
®2k+1 before any merger occurs, which is increasing in ®2.
94.2 Pollution damages
Given the polluting ¯rm's optimal production and abatement levels x = 1 ¡ c ¡ p and A =
1 ¡ c ¡ 1+t











The higher the price p for pollution abatement goods and services, the higher the emission level.
Conversely, the higher the tax t, the lower the emissions.
Following a merger in the eco-industry, we have that pm > p, so the price of abatement
increases. All things equal, such a merger then induces less abatement e®ort and favors further
depletion of environmental resources.
Consider now the net di®erence between post-merger and pre-merger pollution damages,




2t2 ) . (8)
When t increases, the denominator in (8) grows, which tends to lessen the pollution induced by
a merger of environment ¯rms. On the other hand, t also a®ects the numerator in (8) in a way
which is described in the following Lemma.9
Lemma 2 (i) The higher t (resp. n), the higher (resp. lower) the initial abatement price p.
(ii) The higher the initial price, the higher the di®erence between post and pre-merger prices.
It follows that a higher tax augments the numerator in (8). Setting a larger emission tax thus
has an ambiguous e®ect on the variation in pollution after some environment ¯rms merge.
According to our simulations, a higher tax (particularly at already low taxation levels) might
actually bring about a higher variation in environmental quality after a merger occurs. This
fact and its rationale constitute the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Variation in pollution damages following a horizontal merger in the eco-industry
are magni¯ed under higher emission taxes, when the indirect negative impact of a merger on
environmental quality | through the di®erence between post and pre-merger abatement prices
| exceeds the direct positive impact of the tax.
Note that an increase in the number of environment ¯rms n will alleviate this problem by
reducing the gap between pm and p (see Lemma 2).10
9Proof available upon request.
10According to the previous section, moreover, higher emission taxes tend to deter merging activities per se.
The overall e®ect on pollution of imposing more stringent emission taxes is therefore di±cult to characterize in
general.
104.3 Polluters' pro¯ts
The overall e®ect of a merger on polluters' pro¯ts seems ambiguous. Recall that the represen-
tative polluter's pro¯t is ' = Px ¡ cx ¡ pA ¡ te(x;A). The price P of the ¯nal good being
positively correlated with the price for abatement (since P = c+p), it thus increases after some
environment ¯rms merge. Under those circumstances, polluters also produce less, which lowers
total production costs. The variation of pA, on the other hand, is unclear, since p increases but
A goes down. Moreover, polluting emissions are higher after a merger, so the tax payment is
increased.
Let us now substitute the optimal levels of output and abatement e®ort by polluting ¯rms
(x = 1 ¡ c ¡ p and A = 1 ¡ c ¡ 1+t
t p) in their pro¯t function. The di®erence between post- and





> 0 . (9)
In the present model, a horizontal merger in the eco-industry therefore increases polluters'
pro¯ts. This (perhaps surprising) result comes from the fact that the higher equilibrium price
P more than compensates for higher abatement costs and tax payment.
4.4 Consumer surplus
Following a merger in the eco-industry, polluting ¯rms produce less and the price of the ¯nal
good increases. Consumer surplus then shrinks.
To see more precisely what happens, use the equilibrium levels of P and x to write the
di®erence between post- and pre-merger consumer surplus as
¢CS = (1 + c)(p ¡ pm) . (10)
This entity is necessarily negative, since pm > p. As the environmental tax increases, the gap
between pm and p grows bigger so the incurred loss worsens. From the previous section, however,
we know this impact is reduced when there are more competing environment ¯rms or the price
of abatement goods and services is low.
4.5 Total welfare
In sum, a merger of environment ¯rms has opposite e®ects on welfare: it decreases environmental
quality and consumer surplus but increases the eco-industry and the polluting sector's pro¯ts.










¡ ºe(x;A) . (11)
At the equilibrium levels of x and A, the latter transforms into
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B)2 is the Her¯ndahl index of the eco-industry.11 Only the last
term of the latter expression is modi¯ed by the occurrence of a merger. Hence, a horizontal

























where hm is the eco-industry's Her¯ndhal index after the merger. Rearranging this inequality
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A horizontal merger in the eco-industry is welfare-enhancing if and only if
B(1 ¡ B:h)(1 + Bm)2 ¡ Bm(1 ¡ Bm:hm)(1 + B)2




This result gives rise to several interesting interpretations. First, as º increases, a merger in
the eco-industry is less likely to be welfare-increasing (for the right-hand-side of (13) increases in
º). This is not surprising since such a merger induces less abatement e®orts to curb emissions;
were pollution in°icting more damage on society, having some environment ¯rms merge would
then be less desirable.
We have studied the impact on (13) of the number of environment ¯rms n. This number a®ects
only the left-hand-side of (13), where it has an ambiguous e®ect. First, a higher n reduces the
negative consequences of a merger on the environment and on downstream users, while raising
the potential cost economies one could get through a merger. On the other hand, when n
increases for a given s, the proportion of insiders decreases, thereby reducing the cost economies
this particular merger would yield.12 No clear-cut conclusion therefore exists concerning the
impact of an increase in n on condition (13). When K = 1, however, it can be shown that a
larger n always makes a merger more likely to be welfare enhancing.
The emission tax t shows up on the right-hand-side of expression (13), which increases in t if
11The algebra that lead to this expression can be found in Appendix ??.
12Recall that the outsiders' production costs always increase after a merger.
12t is not too low. It is also implicit on the left-hand-side, through ®2 which enlarges B and Bm
but diminishes hm.13 Overall, the e®ect of t on condition (13) is therefore uncertain.
Finally, note that the denominator of the left-hand-side of (13) is positive, since Bm is always
smaller than B. The right-hand-side of (13) is also always positive. The following corollary is
thus at hand.









This inequality means that total production costs in the eco-industry decrease with the merger.
















We can show that the sign of the di®erence ´m ¡ ´ between post-merger and pre-merger total
costs is in fact given by the following polynomial
Ã = ¡(®2k)3[ns2 ¡ s(n2 + n ¡ 1) + (n + 1)2] ¡ 2(®2k)2(s + 2n + 2) ¡ ®2k(s + 2n + 5) ¡ 2:
If the term [ns2 ¡s(n2 +n¡1)+(n+1)2]) is positive, then the whole expression is necessarily
negative (so total costs would be reduced with the merger). Otherwise, Ã may either be positive
or negative. The following proposition ¯nally covers the two cases.
Proposition 4 There are circumstances when a merger may increase total production costs in
the eco-industry. This only happens in an industry with at least ¯ve ¯rms and when the number
of merging ¯rms (s) is small compared to the total number of incumbent ¯rms (n).
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the rationale and welfare consequences of horizontal mergers in the
eco-industry. We assumed that such a merger creates a new entity with lower production costs
13In our model, since pre-merger ¯rms are symmetric, h = 1=n so h does not depend on t.
13(because of synergies between previously separate ¯rms), while increasing concentration in the
eco-industry and therefore raising the price of pollution abatement goods and services.
In terms of welfare, it appears that mergers involving environment ¯rms are not desirable
if the social cost of pollution is large. When pollution generates major damages, however, it
is reasonable to expect that the regulator will adopt a more stringent environmental policy,
putting for example higher taxes on polluting emissions. Section 3 established that such a
measure actually hampers incentives to merge in the eco-industry (a merger would have to
include a larger number of ¯rms in order to raise these ¯rms' pro¯ts). This key result seems
empirically testable. Its underlying intuition runs as follows: a more stringent tax will decrease
the price-elasticity of demand for environmental goods and services, thereby allowing outsiders
to a merger to bene¯t even more from the larger residual demand.
Sections 4 also emphasized that environmental costs should supplement conventional welfare
analyses of mergers when dealing with horizontal mergers in the eco-industry.
Some possible extensions of the present work might be worth mentioning at this point. Other
(more realistic) market structures should certainly be considered, such as asymmetric oligopolies
and oligopolies with a competitive fringe. It would also be instructive and useful, moreover, to
study the optimal emission tax in this context; to be sure, the proposed policy would now have
to internalize its e®ect on the structure of the eco-industry.
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